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Edit File: submit-token.php
<?php /** * Form Submission Token. * * Generates and verifies time-windowed HMAC tokens used to authenticate * public form submissions. Unlike WordPress nonces (12–24 h expiry), these * tokens are keyed on half-day windows and remain valid across multiple * windows, making them safe to embed in cached pages without any client-side * refresh logic. * * @package SureForms * @since 2.6.0 */ namespace SRFM\Inc; if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) { exit; } /** * Submit_Token * * Security properties: * - HMAC-SHA256 keyed on the site's WordPress auth salt (unique per install). * - Tokens are form-specific: a token issued for form 5 is invalid for form 6. * - Each token encodes a half-day time window (43 200 s). Verification accepts * the current window plus the previous SRFM_SUBMIT_TOKEN_ACCEPTED_WINDOWS − 1 * windows, giving up to 48 hours of validity. This covers even aggressive CDN * or full-page-cache TTLs without any refresh round-trip from the browser. * - Constant-time comparison (`hash_equals`) prevents timing-based oracle attacks. * * @since 2.6.0 */ class Submit_Token { /** * Length of a single time window in seconds (12 hours). * * Rotating every 12 hours keeps the attack window short while staying * far below typical cache TTLs. * * @since 2.6.0 */ public const WINDOW_SECONDS = 43200; /** * Number of consecutive windows that are considered valid. * * 4 windows × 12 hours = 48 hours maximum token lifetime. * Raise via the `srfm_submit_token_accepted_windows` filter if your * deployment uses unusually long cache TTLs. * * @since 2.6.0 */ public const DEFAULT_ACCEPTED_WINDOWS = 4; /** * Generate a submission token for a given form. * * The token encodes the form ID and the current half-day window, signed * with the site's auth salt. It is safe to embed in cached HTML because * `verify()` accepts several consecutive past windows. * * @since 2.6.0 * @param int $form_id The form post ID. * @return string 64-character lowercase hex HMAC-SHA256 token. */ public static function generate( int $form_id ): string { return self::sign( $form_id, self::current_window() ); } /** * Verify a token submitted with a form. * * Checks the token against every accepted window, from newest to oldest, * using constant-time comparison throughout. * * @since 2.6.0 * @param string $token Token value received from the client. * @param int $form_id Form post ID extracted from the request body. * @return bool True if the token is valid for the given form, false otherwise. */ public static function verify( string $token, int $form_id ): bool { if ( '' === $token || $form_id <= 0 ) { return false; } // Clamp to [1, 14]: must accept at least one window; cap at 14 (7 days) // to prevent a misconfigured filter from making tokens effectively permanent. $accepted = max( 1, min( 14, (int) apply_filters( 'srfm_submit_token_accepted_windows', self::DEFAULT_ACCEPTED_WINDOWS ) ) ); // Walk backwards through accepted windows; current window first. for ( $offset = 0; $offset < $accepted; $offset++ ) { if ( hash_equals( self::sign( $form_id, self::current_window() - $offset ), $token ) ) { return true; } } return false; } /** * Return the index of the current half-day window. * * Dividing Unix time by WINDOW_SECONDS yields an integer that increments * once every 12 hours, regardless of the server's local timezone. * * @since 2.6.0 * @return int */ private static function current_window(): int { return (int) floor( time() / self::WINDOW_SECONDS ); } /** * Build an HMAC-SHA256 signature for a specific form / window pair. * * The payload deliberately combines a namespace prefix, the form ID, and * the window index so that tokens cannot be repurposed across forms or * replayed across time windows. * * @since 2.6.0 * @param int $form_id Post ID of the form. * @param int $window Half-day window index. * @return string 64-character lowercase hex digest. */ private static function sign( int $form_id, int $window ): string { // Derive a plugin-specific sub-key from the site's auth salt so this // system has an independent key surface from WordPress session cookies. // Rotating wp-config.php secrets invalidates all outstanding tokens, which // is intentional — a cache purge should follow any secret key rotation. $signing_key = hash_hmac( 'sha256', 'srfm-submit-token-v1', wp_salt( 'auth' ) ); $payload = implode( '|', [ 'srfm_submit', $form_id, $window ] ); return hash_hmac( 'sha256', $payload, $signing_key ); } }
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